Axis of Evil Re-Visited, or Bush's Brilliance:
A Primer in How NOT to Conduct Foreign Policy
By William Hessell


Current provocations from North Korea, and earlier and continuing challenges from Iran, highlight what has unquestionably been four years of the most abject failure of United States foreign policy in recent history.  The Bush administration's insistence on initiating an invasion and occupation of Iraq has been central in determining this demise in our international leadership, but more subtle factors have led to our policy ineptness.  How Bush and his brain trust lost the international support that our nation commanded after Sept. 11, 2001, and maintained through the coordinated military action in Afghanistan, offers a primer in how not to conduct foreign policy that will be discussed for generations.

The groundwork for our Iraqi occupation was laid well before 9-11, when some neo-conservative think-tank leaders, together with some mid-level Defense Dep't officials who were close to Cheney and Rumsfeld, incensed that Saddam Hussein was allowed to remain in power following the first Iraqi war, drew up a policy paper promoting a rationale and plans for implementing Hussein's removal.  These plans laid dormant during Clinton's presidency, but with Bush's election in 2000, those advocating a US take-over in Iraq assumed key administration positions, and the tragedy of 9-11 presented them with an opportunity to push for their policy coup.  The sequence of events in how the facts concerning Iraq's WMD threat and involvement with Al Queda were repeatedly altered to support our entry into Iraq are well-known, and our efforts to obtain a "coalition of the willing" to support our endeavor produced meager results at best.

One of the most significant events in Bush's post 9-11 foreign policy was his axis of evil references during his 2002 State of the Union address, in which he labeled Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as key members of the "axis of evil", calling them the primary purveyors of world terrorism.  A quick review of what has transpired with these three countries since Bush identified them as paramount in the axis of evil underscores how Bush's policy has failed.  More than three years after our troops entered Iraq, the situation there is still highly unstable, with the local government paralyzed in attempts to take effective action, including even providing basic security and services; daily mass civilian killings occurring between competing religious and political groups; and over 2600 American solders having lost their lives, not to mention 10's of thousands seriously wounded as they attempt to fulfill their questionably-defined roles.

In Iran, following the Axis of Evil speech, a more moderate leader was replaced by a strongly anti-American head of government who, with full approval of religious leaders in that country, are intent on resuming nuclear development and are unreserved in expressing their antagonism to western influence.  Developing international support to counter and to sanction Iran's more threatening positions has been difficult and limited due to our influence and credibility being weakened by our flawed Iraqi policies.

A similar situation is occurring with North Korea over their attempted development of an intercontinental ballistic missile capability to go along with the nuclear potential they already have.  As dictatorial and abusive as that government is, it is not surprising that any government  might respond to being on our public axis of evil list by acting as tough as possible and by seeking any weaponry that might be available.  Especially since Iraq, first on the list, has already been preemptively invaded.  It has not been Bush's policy to attempt any direct diplomatic negotiation with our announced adversaries, and multi-lateral attempts to facilitate positive changes have been of minimal effectiveness.

In revisiting the Axis of Evil speech, however true some of the characterizations expressed may have been, as a foreign  policy pronouncement it has to be seen as a smashing failure.  It has emboldened those countries to act against our interests with more conviction, short-circuited any attempts at rapprochement through negotiating to find common ground, and made it more difficult for allies and international organizations to mediate differences and resolve areas of conflict.  Much international respect and goodwill has been squandered as some key allies were alienated by a "you are for us or against us" attitude.  Until recently, administration policy has been to bypass the United Nations as a possible avenue of pursuing desired changes, and our credibility and influence within that organization has eroded.  In short, not only have we failed to achieve our expressed foreign policy objectives since deciding to enter Iraq as a part of our war on terror, but we have also demonstrated a failure in the process of developing and implementing effective foreign policy that is likely to hinder our diplomatic efforts for years to come.